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A MORE EQUITABLE PAST? SOUTHERN
SUPREME COURTS AND THE PROTECTION OF
THE ANTEBELLUM NEGRO
A. E. KEn NASH*
r.

SOUTHERN APPELLATE JUSTICE TODAY AND YESTERDAYA QUESTION OF EXTRAPOLATION

The recent refusal of the United States Senate, by a vote of fifty-five
to forty-five, to confirm Judge. Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr,, to fill the
vacancy created by Justice Abe Fortas' resignation from the United States
Supreme Court marked only the second time in the twentieth century
that the Senate has rejected a presidential nominee to the High Court.
Thirty-nine years earlier, Herbert Hoover had been no more successful
than was Richard Nixon in 1969. Both Presidents were Republicans,
and both Haynsworth and Hoover's rejected nominee, John J. Parker,
were Southerners. Indeed, the parallel runs closer: both were Carolinians
and members of the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
and both nominations were strenuously opposed by labor unions and by
civil rights advocates.
It is the latter point that is significant here, for it seems safe to say
that had either Judge been known as a "progressive" in respect to civil

rights, the outcome would have been senatorial acquiescence in presidential
selection.' Whether either President would have designated the same
nominee had his civil rights reputation been different is not relevant.
The essential point is, rather, that a substantial part of the opposition to
both nominations derived from a wide-spread national feeling that Southern appellate judges of the twentieth century have too frequently reflected
local community sentiments of the white majority about the proper status
of the black minority and have too infrequently displayed eagerness to
render decisions in line with broadly egalitarian readings of the fourteenth
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa
Barbara. A.B., Harvard College, 1958. M.A., University of North Carolina, 1961.
Ph.D., Harvard University, 1967.
11 find it hard to believe that the additional factor to which opponents of the
Haynsworth nomination pointed-the Judge's alleged error of omission in neglecting to disqualify himself from sitting on a handful of cases in which he was said
to have a "conflict of interest"--would, minus the civil rights question, have availed
to produce an adverse majority vote.
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and fifteenth amendments. I have perhaps understated the matter. Certainly, there have been stronger expressions. Thus, five years ago, an
attorney for the Legal Defense and Education Fund of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, declared:
One expects a degree of impartiality from the state appellate courts.
Because they are elected by a statewide constituency, political pressure
is less concentrated and more easily parried by these judges. They are
somewhat removed from the courthouse gang of prosecutors and police
who dominate southern politics in all but the larger cities. Unfortunately, such expectations of impartiality are not fulfilled. State appellate
courts have shown themselves to be as susceptible as local courts to
pressure and prejudice against Negro rights. 2
The attorney, Michael Meltsner, was referring to state appellate courts,
but it is probably fair to take his statement as representative of the attitude of many non-Southerners toward all Southern appellate courts,
federal as well as state. Moreover, it is probably fair to describe this
view of Southern justice as one that would extend its adverse judgment
about Southern appellate courts quite far back in time, at least to the
post-Reconstruction era if not to well before the Civil War.
It is not my purpose in this article to evaluate the contemporary
aspects of that judgment. Rather, what I wish to raise is a question
suggested by one of the earliest court decisions in that most Southern of
states, Mississippi. Four years after her admission to statehood, one of
her judges was confronted by a white man convicted under a common
law indictment of murdering a slave.3 Justice J. G. Clarke was asked
by the defendant to rule that the American slave could derive no protective benefit from the common law, but only from specific statutory prohibitions. Rejecting the appellant's contention, Justice Clarke declared
that slavery itself had no foundation in the law of nature but only in
positive statute. He concluded that the captive Negro had all natural rights
except those expressly removed by legislation. A slave "is still a human
being, and possesses all those rights, of which he is not deprived by the
positive provisions of the law .

. . .,

Turning to ancient history, Clarke

argued that even the "northern barbarians" who conquered Rome had
deemed it murder whether the victim were free or slave. He concluded
I Meltsner, Southern Appellate Courts: A Dead End, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE
136, 138-39 (L. Friedman ed. 1965).

sState v. Jones, 2 Miss. (Walker) 83 (1820).
'Id. at 84.
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rhetorically: "And shall this court, in the nineteenth century, establish a
principle too sanguinary for the code even of the Goths and the Vandals ?"'
The answer was no, and defendant Jones was sentenced "to be hung on
the 27th July "1821." 6
It is not at all obvious that mid-twentieth-century Southern judges
are as convinced of the humanity of the Negro as were their forebears in
an age of slavery. Or, to approach the problem from another direction:
do we analyze correctly the genetics of contemporary Southern justiceand thus do we "prescribe" properly for its "cure"-if we expand our
perceptions of cases such as Brown v. MississippLg backward into a
general characterization of Southern courts as inclined to apply to Negroes
a principle too sanguinary even for the Goths and the Vandals? It is
hardly an uncommon expansion by historians. Stanley Elkins stated the
resulting view of the matter elegantly in his brilliant brief for the interpretation of the Negro's Southern experience as an extended residence in a
gigantic and terrifying concentration camp. Even where statutory protection of the Negro existed, he found that a great gulf was fixed between
the words and the application of the law:
[W]herever protection was on the one hand theoretically extended, it
was practically cancelled on the other by the universal prohibition in
Southern law against permitting slaves to testify in court, except
against each other . .. Even the murder of a slave found the law

straining all its resources to avoid jurisdiction.8
According to a prominent Negro historian, John Hope Franklin, moderate
rational Southerners lost out to militant supporters of lynch-law after
the rise of Northern abolitionist attacks upon the South in the 1 830's:
"All over the South mob action began to replace orderly judicial procedure, as the feeling against abolitionists mounted and as Southern views
on race became crystallized."'
This picture of the antebellum South as given to speedy and violent
Id. at 86.

6 Id.

297 U.S. 278 (1936), rev'g 173 Miss. 180, 161 So. 465 (1935). The Mississippi

Supreme Court, while recognizing that confessions of murder were coerced by
physical torture of the Negro defendants, held that due process was not violated
by admitting the confessions since defendants' objections to the admission were not
technically correct and therefore amounted to a waiver of their right against selfincrimination. 173 Miss. 180, 161 So. 465 (1935).
'S. ELKINS, SLAVERY 56-58 (1963).
'J.FRANKLIN, THE MILITANT SOUTH at ix (1964).
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settlement of Negro-white imbroglios with scarcely a nod to. the formal
law's delays amounts to something like the "Standard Version." Without seeking to deny the obvious partial truths of this version of thingscertainly permitting slaves to testify against whites should have greatly
helped the Negro's quest for justice, certainly mob violence was far too
frequent-let me urge that its truths are defective. Prior to the Civil
War "Negro law" differed in at least one important respect from both
the "concentration camp" paradigm and from the sort of "justice" that
prevailed after Reconstruction. One important sector of Southern gov-.
ernments, far from straining to avoid jurisdiciton over white assaults
upon Negroes, strained to exercise it. Between the end of the eighteenth
century and the Civil War, and particularly between 1830 and 1860,
Southern state supreme courts sought almost without exception to expand protection of the Negro.1" If we wish to continue the "concentration
camp" analogy, we should modify it to suggest that, at the top, stood
judicial guardians determined to do what they could to ameliorate the
terrorism of the peculiar institution of slavery. Just as in the related
area of criminal trials of Negroes in which Southern judges demonstrated
their. determination to accord as fair trials as latitudinarian construction
of statutes and precedents would permit,"1 so here, in the area of our
interest, Southern judges lent their willing aid to the punishment of whites
who injured Negroes, whether bond or free.
This thesis, if sustained, has at least two implications. The first is
a question of historiographical readjustment of the American past. The
second bears upon the future quest for justice in the South: perhaps the
problem for civil rights lawyers and federal appeals courts is not so much
to inculcate a sense of law where none ever existed as it is to reawaken a
regionally-indigenous behavior once genuinely inclined to greater fairness.

II. THE NORTH CAROLINA COURT-NATURAL AND
UNNATURAL LAW, 1800-1830
Despite the presence of the Negro on American shores since 1619 and
despite attempts to establish order through the Slave Codes of the preoUnless otherwise specified, this conclusion and other generalizations in this
article apply to the supreme courts of all states that seceded in 1860-61, except
Virginia and Louisiana. Virginia's Court of Appeals did not have criminal jurisdiction until 1851. Louisiana was not a common law state.
I See Nash, Fairnessand Formalismin Trials of Blacks in the Supreme Courts
of the Old Soth, 56 VA. L. Rav. - (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fair Trials for
Blacks].
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revolutionary generation,"2 the early years of the Republic awaited settlement of a very basic question about the status of the African import.
The fact of unresolved status was unduly dimmed by time. Thus, Chief
3 could conJustice Roger Taney, writing in 1857 in Scott v. Sanford,"
fidently assert that, no matter what individual actions a state might take,
the 1789 Constitution excluded Negroes from its social contract. Taney
sought to eliminate the apparent conflict between the fact of slavery
and the all-encompassing rights to liberty proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence by urging that the framers were not slipshod authors. They
were
great men-high in literary acquirements-high in their sense of honor,
and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which
they were acting. They perfectly understood the meaning of the
language they used, and how it would be understood by others; and
they knew that it would not, in any part of the civilized world, be
supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had
been excluded from civilized governments and the family of nations,
and doomed to slavery.... This state of public opinion had undergone
no change when the Constitution was adopted ....14
Without disputing Taney's specific conclusion that the Constitution's
framers did not mean to extend United States citizenship to freed Negroes,
let me urge that the generalization leading to his conclusion offered an
illusory picture of certainty about the Negro's status in that earlier age.
Previously in his Dred Scott opinion Taney had observed that the Negro
"was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise
and traffic .

. .

."5 If Taney meant this statement as a non-exhaustive

description, it is unassailable. Yet it seems to imply more-that the slave
was always regarded as an ordinary article of merchandise. That interpretation is flatly inaccurate-and not merely with reference to occasional
Jeffersonian qualms about the peculiar institution. Rather, on the far
more important level of the state supreme courts-final arbiters in that
pre-fourteenth-amendment day of the main body of personal rightsradical uncertainty obtained precisely because the slave was not regarded
as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic. On the contrary, he was
2

E .g., Slave Act of 1741, ch. XXIV N.C. Laws 85 (1791) (North Carolina);
Act of May 10, 1740, No. 670, 3 S.C. Stat. 568 (1716-1752) (South Carolina).
1860 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)..
1,Id. at 410.

Id. at 407.
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regarded as extraordinary-not merely because he was both perishable
and expensive but because of uncertainty as to just how much of him was
property and how much humanity. Nor was the uncertainty in the least
bit relieved by confidence in his inferiority to the white man. It is true
that Southern judges occasionally managed very clear definitions of status.
Two years after Dred Scott, a Mississippi judge offered an extraordinary
justification for his refusal to allow an ex-Mississippi slave living as a
free Negro in Ohio to bring suit for inherited property. Justice William
Harris took Ohio to task for freeing the plaintiff and embracing "as
citizens, the neglected race . . . occupying, in the order of nature, an
10
intermediate state between the irrational animal and the white man."
He advanced a peculiarly horrible rationale to support his claim that not
Mississippi but Ohio was guilty of denying interstate principles of comity:
Suppose that Ohio, still further afflicted with her peculiar philanthropy,
should be determined to descend another grade in the scale of her
peculiar humanity, and claim to confer citizenship on the chimpanzee
or the ourang-outang (the most respectable of the monkey tribe), are
we to be told that "comity" will require of the States not thus demented,
to ...meet the necessities of the mongrel race thus attempted to be
introduced into the family of sisters in this confederacy ?17
If Harris' views typified Southern attitudes, we might well agree with
the substance, if not the dating, of Justice Taney's certainty. That the
matter was far less simple and far less definite is suggested by the circumstance that Harris was overturning a precedent not a year old,18
and that the author of the precedent, still on the bench, disagreed
vehemently. Justice Alex Handy-though a firm believer in both the
right of secession and the positive goodness of slavery-dissented because
Harris' position that the Negro was to be regarded as an alien enemy
under international law would make it impossible for a freed Negro unlawfully kidnapped and held as a slave to bring suit for freedom, would
remove the "restraint in our law against taking his life," 1 and would
resurrect "the barbarian rules which prevailed in the dark ages."20 The
matter is made yet less simple-indeed it reopens the whole question-if
we compare Harris' logic with the reasoning advanced by a Tennessee
Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 263 (1859).
1 Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246 (1858)..
'°37 Miss. at 281 (Handy, J., dissenting).
20 Id.at 282.
" Mitchell v.
17
Id. at 264.
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judge to reach precisely the opposite conclusion in respect to a Negro
whose status should have been less likely to result in a favorable outcome.
In Ford v.Ford,2 a slave sought to sue an executor who was delaying
carrying into effect his master's bequest of freedom. The executor, attempting to borrow a leaf from the book that Taney must have read, asserted
that the Negro in bondage is a piece of chattel property and that chattels
cannot sue. Nonsense, declared Judge Nathan Green:
[A Negro in bondage] is made after the image of the Creator. He has
mental capacities and an immortal principle in his nature, that constitute him equal to his owner but for the accidental position in which
fortune has placed him. The owner has acquired conventional rights
to him, but the laws under which he is22 held as a slave have not and
cannot extinguish his high-born nature
In 1859 the Tennessee Court upheld 23 and indeed expanded its decision in
Ford. Nevertheless, it would appear safest to hypothesize that, Justice
Taney notwithstanding, as late as the Civil War the elements of property
and humanity making up the slave had not been analyzed in a fashion
acceptable to all Southern supreme court judges.
The first question needing analysis-first in terms of both jurisprudential logic and existential importance to the enslaved Negro-was
that which defendant Jones posed in 1821 to Justice Clarke: was the
slave entitled to the protection of the common law, or could he depend
only on the far more flimsy armor of statute? Was he as much at the
mercy of his owner's whim as he had been at the instant of his capture
in the African jungle, except insofar as the legislature had limited the
master's absolute power, or did he enjoy the general peace of the state?
Chance, early settlement, and structural conditions combined to bring
this question first before the North Carolina Supreme Court.2 In De2126 Tenn. 92 (1846).

Id. at 95-96.

Stephenson v. Harrison, 40 Tenn. 728 (1859). Slaves were allowed to bring
a cross-bill by a next friend to protect their interest in a trust.
2" Of the four South Atlantic states whose early settlement made such consideration likely, two were "disqualified" by structural conditions. As previously noted,
Virginia's Court of Appeals was restricted to civil jurisdiction until 1851, while
Georgia's legislators did not even create a supreme court until 1845. South Carolina would have been as likely a forum as North Carolina, yet the issue was never
heard by the full court until the early 1830's when the South Carolina court
reached a negative conclusion. See, e.g., Helton v. Caston, 18 S.C.L. 45, 2 Bail. L.
95 (1831); State v. Maner, 20 S.C.L. 249, 2 Hill 453 (1834). "There can be...
no offense against the State for a mere beating of a slave ....The peace of the
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cember 1801, State v. Boon2 5 provided the opening round for a dispute
that was to last for the greater part of the tenures of the two most influential early nineteenth-century North Carolina judges, John Louis
Taylor 26 and John Hall.2 7
Boon had been convicted under a 1791 act that provided:
[I]f any person shall hereafter be guilty of wilfully and maliciously
killing a slave, such offender shall upon the first conviction thereof,
be adjudged guilty of murder, and shall suffer the same punishment as
if he had killed a freeman; any law, usage, or custom to the contrary
28
notwithstanding.
This law expressly repealed a statute of 1774 that had merely imposed
a year's imprisonment for murdering a slave.2 Since there was no doubt
that Boon had killed maliciously, one could well be excused for thinking
that he should suffer death, the penalty for first degree murder of a freeman. The lower court judge thought otherwise and sent the case directly
to the supreme court. It was not an easy problem; the wording of the
1791 Act contained a stumbling block. As Judge Hall observed:
It may be thought that the words 'shall suffer the same punishment
as if he had killed a freeman' . . . should be allowed to have this
meaning . . . 'as if he had wilfully and maliciously killed a freeman.'

I cannot agree.3 0
"Killed" could mean anything from justifiable homicide to murder with
malice aforethought. What were the justices to do? They were confronted with a deed of which they thoroughly disapproved.31 Nor was
"there ...doubt... respecting the intention of the Legislature" ;82 almost

certainly it intended to establish equal punishments for first degree murder.
The decisive factor, however, was a historical principle of Anglo-Saxon
juridical practice: "Judges in this country as well as in England have
State is not thereby broken, for a slave is not generally regarded as fully capable
of being within the peace of the state." Id. at 249, 2 Hill at 454.

1 N.C. 191 (1801).
"Chief Justice, 1800-1829.
'
28

Associate Judge, 1800-1833.
Cli. IV N.C. Laws 3 (Supp. 1791-94).

"Act of March 2, 1774, ch. XXXI N.C. Laws 274 (1791).
"01 N.C. at 193.
1 Judge Samuel Johnston's opinion of Boon's action was probably shared by
his Brethren: "The murder of a slave appears to me a crime of the most atrocious
and barbarous nature; much more so than killing a person who is free, and on an
equal footing." Id. at 198.

so Id.
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.. .invariably adhered to very strict rules in the construction of penal
statutes in favor of life... nothing shall be taken by construction ...
The court unanimously agreed that the 1791 Act
from the context."' '
could not be applied because of its vague conclusion. The court could have
left the issue there; further deliberation was not necessary to the disposition of the case. That indeed was what Judges Macay and Johnston
did. Yet Hall and Taylor felt called upon to inquire about the status
of the slave prior to the 1774 statute. Presumably they wished to shed
some light on a future possibility-indictments for slave-killing brought
under the common law. But the beams cast by their respective reasons
shone in utterly different directions.
John Hall started up the road that would soon become a familiar
path for extremist pro-slavery judges-one that rejected arguments on
behalf of the similarity between English villeinage and American slavery,
and thus cut off at its source any stream of logic that sought to flow
from the historic inclusion of the villein under common law to similar
protection of the slave. In Hall's view, English villeinage shed very little
light on the subject of slavery. Villeins were the king's subjects, and
though attached to the land, could sue everyone except their immediate
lords, whereas "slaves in this country possess no such rights; their condition is more abject; they are not parties to our constitution; it was
not made for them." 4
Did the slave enjoy any protection under the common law? To answer
this question, Hall turned to England and Blackstone. According to
Blackstone, the slave on his arrival in England "falls under the protection
of the laws, and so far becomes a freeman. . . .""

But why did this

occur? Simply because English law does not recognize slavery on
English soil. "[T]he moment he lands in England he undergoes a
change,. . .in contemplation of the law, at least, he is no longer a slave,
but a free man.""6
Yet conversely:
[I]t would follow, that if... his condition of slavery were not altered,
the laws would not extend their protection to him; because a slave
in a pure state of slavery has no rights.... Montesquieu, in his Spirit
of Laws ... and Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries ...
8

Id. at 199.
,Id. at 195. Compare Scott v. Sanford, p. 201 supra.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMES *127.

"1 N.C. at 194.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

define slavery to be, that whereby an absolute power is given to the
37
master, over the life and fortune of the slave.
Although some slave countries had taken away this absolute power, the
resulting restraints
were the consequence of positive laws: they did not exist before these
laws imposed them; they were unknown in a pure state of slavery....
[H]e that was taken in battle, remained bound to his taker forever,
and he could do with him as with his beast; he could kill him with
impunity.38
In sum, the North Carolina slave had rights only insofar as he had been
granted them by express legislative enactment. Absent it, the right to
kill simply transferred with the bill of sale. John Hall might have
considered his state's "connection with slavery" to be unfortunate,8" but
so long as slavery remained, his deductions from its Romanist premises
would be remorseless.
Having been clearly shown by Hall where rigorous logic led, John
Louis Taylor-a London-born waif who had come to Virginia at the
age of 12, earned his way through William & Mary, moved to North
Carolina, and been elected to the state legislature in 1794 where he had
sponsored several unsuccessful bills to encourage manumission-balked.
In pained sentences he declared:
I can not yield my assent to the position, that a new felony is
created by the act of 1791, or that any offense is created which did not
antecedently exist. For the killing of a slave, if accompanied with those
circumstances which constitute murder, amounts to that crime in my
judgment, as much as the killing of a free man.40
After all, "a slave is a reasonable creature," and there was another natural
law than that of which Hall spoke.
Upon what foundation can the claim of a master to an absolute
dominion over the life of his slave, be rested? The authority for it, is
not to be found in the law of nature, for that will authorize a man to
take away the life of another, only from the unavoidable necessity of
87 Id..
88
ld. at 195.
8o In fairness, I should note that Hall, a Democratic Republican originally from
Virginia, was not himself a proponent of slavery. See his opinion in Trustees
of the Quaker Society v. Dickenson, 12 N.C. 189, 208 (1827).
"01 N.C. at 199.
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saving his own; and of this code, the cardinal duty is to abstain from
injury, and do all the good we can. It is not the necessary consequence

of the state of slavery, for that may exist without it; and its natural
inconveniences ought not to be aggravated by an evil, at which reason,
religion, humanity, and policy equally revolt. 41

The legislature could make what changes it willed in the positive law, but
the crime is unchanged in its essence, undiminished in its enormity.
The scale of its guilt exists in those relations of things which are
prior to human institutions, and whose sanctions must remain forever
unimpaired. 42
With these words, Taylor placed in American slavery jurisprudence
an alternate Natural Law tradition to the Continental doctrine offered by
Hall. Taylor's version was a singular blend of several English political
theories most beneficial to Negro rights. Absolute dominion is not to be
found in the law of nature-but not in whose law of nature? He begins
with nothing more positive than a Hobbesian position-a man can only
kill "from the unavoidable necessity of saving his own" life. Then he
proceeds in the same sentence to a statement seemingly imbued with
Lockean ethics-the cardinal duty is to abstain from injury. Finally,
with but a comma separating theory from theory, he reaches back to the
medievalism of Hooker to discover a positive duty of doing all the
good we can.43
Neither side could "win" in State v. Boon, but the dicta of today
might become the doctrine of tomorrow. Tomorrow came, indeed, but
not for nearly a quarter of a century, not until June 1823 when State v.
Reed44 reached the court, which was then a three-man bench consisting
of Judges Taylor, Hall, and Henderson. In Reed, the plaintiff-in-error
sought a new trial because he had been convicted for murder of a slave
under an indictment that concluded at common law rather than in formam
statuti.

Predictably, Judge Hall agreed with the contentions of Reed's counsel:
if the murder of a slave were held a common law offense, so must any
other injury-such as assault or mayhem-actionable under common law.
And he may well have been flattered by the lawyer's statement: "[I]n
" Id.at 199-200.
2Id. at 200.
"Id. at 199.
"9 N.C. 454 (1823).
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this country the subject has been fully examined, and the argument of
Hall, Judge, in The State v. Boon . . . is unanswerably correct, and
'
exhausts the subject."45
Predictably, too, Judge Taylor disagreed with
Reed's counsel, citing his own position in Boon. There was just one
further sentence to his opinion.

I think that there was no necessity to conclude the indictment against
the form of the statute, for a law of paramount obligation to the statute
was violated by the offence-the common-law, founded upon the law
46
of nature, and confirmed by revelation.
In this dispute Judge Leonard Henderson 47 held the balance of power.
He agreed with the results of Taylor's ragout of Higher Law, but his
deciding opinion was far more ingenious. He displayed something of
John Marshall's capacity for giving a veneer of reasoned inevitability
to a tortuous logical path. He began by restating Hall's and Reed's argument that while a Negro might be a reasonable human being and so
the possible victim of murder, as a slave and thus property, his fate was
of no more concern to the state "independently of ... acts of the Legis-

lature ...than... the death of a horse."4 Then he penned two extraordinary sentences:
This is an argument the force of which I cannot feel, and leads to
consequences abhorrent to my nature; yet, if it be the law of the land,
it must be so pronounced. I disclaim all rules or laws in investigating
this question but the common law of England as brought to this
country by our forefathers when they emigrated hither, and as modified
by various declarations of the Legislature since, so as to justify the
49
foregoing definition.
The first sentence augurs judicial self-restraint, yet the second belies it.
By disclaiming all laws but the common law, Henderson virtually transforms the central question into a premise. Having accomplished this
metamorphosis, Henderson has proceeded about three-quarters of the
way toward his goal.
To travel the remaining quarter of the distance, Henderson engaged
5Id.
'Id.
at 455.
T
' A popular Federalist who was appointed Associate Judge by a Republican

legislature in 1808, he served as Chief Justice from 1829 to 1833; unlike Hall and
Taylor, he was a native of North Carolina.
"19 N.C. at 454.
"Id. at 455.
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in some rather dubious legal footwork. In attempting to discredit the
relevance of Continental jurisprudence concerning slavery, he insisted
that neither the laws of modern Turkey nor those of ancient Rome could
have any bearing upon American slavery."0 Turkish law was, of course,
beside the point, but in dismissing Roman jurisprudence so abruptly, he
bypassed a crucial difficulty. As Judge Hall had pointed out, English
decisions that protected the Negro within the motherland did so because
the common law negated the status of slave entirely so long as the Negro
remained in England. Yet English decisions recognizing slavery in the
colonies and on the high seas were based on something other than the
common law. They were based on the reasoning of Continental theoristssuch as Pufendorf, Grotius, and Vattel-whose own thinking depended
heavily on Roman doctrines of slavery. Consequently, it was not at
all obvious how the same common law that could not in England co-exist
with slavery could properly be said to have been "brought to this country"
in a fashion that included slavery and excluded Roman doctrines thereof.
Neither the statement that absolutist doctrines were "abhorrent to
the hearts of all those who have felt the influence of the mild precepts
of Christianity""1 nor the statement that if Hall's views were correct "then
the life of a slave is at the mercy of anyone, even a vagabond ' 52 did much
more than barely obscure this central weakness in Henderson's argument.
Absolutist doctrines might be abhorrent, but they were not ipso facto
irrelevant. Nor did Hall's views lead to the end that Henderson imputed
to them. As in Roman law, the master would have had the right to kill
his slave, but certainly no other person would have possessed such a
right. Henderson, in brief, never really demonstrated that absent positive
statute the common law itself protected the slave from his master. And
53
that was what it was really incumbent upon him to do.
Perhaps the strangest part of all about Henderson's opinion was that
its flaws were not necessary to assuring that Reed got his just deserts.
There was no good reason why the court could not have arrested the
judgment. The prosecutor could then have brought a new indictment and
made sure that it concluded in formam statuti. Was it simply that Judge
Henderson was bent on speedy vengeance, or did he have a greater aim?
00Id. at 456.
31Id.
' Id. at 457.

"'Fora detailed critique of Henderson's opinion, see Nash, Negro Rights and

fliicial Behavior in the Old South (unpublished dissertation, Harvard Univer-

sity) [hereinafter cited as Negro Rights].
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What happened six months later suggests that he did have larger
goals in mind. In December 1823, the court extended the common law
yet further-to protecting the slave from assault and battery by whites.
This time Chief Justice Taylor took the leap. He began his opinion in
State v. Hale5 4 by announcing that the absence of a positive law pertaining
to the offense required deduction from "general principles, from reasonings founded on the common law... 2 5 The appositive phrase indicates

the great tactical advantage for libertarian judicial behavior that was
the legacy of Henderson's Reed opinion: Taylor could now announce
baldly that the general principles were to be those of the common law.
With one value-judgment he dispensed with juridical modesty:
It would be a subject of regret to every thinking person if courts of
justice were restrained by any austere rule of judicature from keeping
pace with the march of benignant policy and provident humanity, which
for many years has characterized every legislative act relative to the
protection of slaves, and which Christianity, by the mild diffusion of
its light and influence, has contributed to promote .... 56
Armed with this optimistic statement, he turned to Hale's objection that
only the master could rightfully seek a remedy for trespass to his slave.
Agreeing that the master had such a right, Taylor justified state interference with a description of Negro psychology somewhat at odds with
the "Sambo" behavior pattern that Stanley Elkins has argued became characteristic of slaves brought from Africa. The slave might
well submit to correction by his master, but "when the same authority is wantonly usurped by a stranger, nature is disposed to assert
her rights, and to prompt the slave to a resistance, often momentarily
successful, sometimes fatally so."" Then he plays a Hendersonian trick:
The public peace is thus broken as much as if a free man had been
beaten, for the party of the aggressor is always the strongest, and such
contests usually terminate by overpowering the slave and inflicting on
him a severe chastisment, without regard to the original cause of the
conflict. There is consequently as much reason for making such
offenses indictable as if a white man had been the victim.59
"'9N.C. 582 (1823).
" Id.
"Id. at 583.

"S. ELINs, SLAVERY 131-33 (1963).
"9 N.C. at 584.

"Id.
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The peace may be practically disturbed, but what is the "reason" that
requires the common law indictment for assault? Certainly neither the
"reason" of pure slavery nor that of necessary protection for the South's
peculiar institution: the problem could have been dealt with by civil suit.
It seems, rather, a Lockean "reason" that decides the basic issue of "the
slave, within-without the law?" by a humanitarian ipse dixit.
One might have expected Judge Hall to deliver a heated dissent to
this further expansion of the common law, but strangely he did not. In
the six months between Reed and Hale he seems to have abandoned his
anti-common law stance. Possibly he felt that as long as his views could
not win, he had best remove any judicial opposition that could become
political fuel for a conservative anti-court movement. Almost certainly
he personally preferred any amelioration of the slave's lot. And it was
a substantial amelioraion: John Louis Taylor and Leonard Henderson
had done as much to help the Southern slave as any American up to that
point in the nineteenth century. Others had tried for a great deal more,
but they had not yet accomplished anything of greater practical effect
than bringing the slave clearly within the peace of the state. What would
happen in other Southern states whose later settlement entailed a later
societal embedding in slavery? One might well anticipate that slavery,
after the invention of the cotton gin had greatly enhanced its economic
attractiveness, would be measurably more exploitative. Equally, one
might expect plantation capitalism to be reflected on the judicial level
by rejection of Taylor's common law doctrines in favor of Hall's
Continental absolutism. One might expect, in short, quick judicial resolution of the Negro's problematic status against "humanity" and in favor
of "property" to precisely the terminus that Roger Taney reached in
Dred Scott.
III. 1829-1832: THE FOUR FATEFUL YEARS
SOUTHERN DECISION-MAKING?

OF

According to what we might call the "Revised Standard Version" of
Southern history,6" Jeffersonian sympathies for dismantling the peculiar
"0"Revised" with respect to revisions of the Northern interpretations that were
prevalent during the post-Civil War decades. The "Revisionist" school formed in
the 1890's at Columbia under Dunning, whose numerous Southern-born graduate
students became the most influential historians of the South during the early
twentieth century. "Standard" since their interpretation-reaching its apogee in
the writings of U. B. Phillips of Georgia-effectively displaced the Northern
school. The essential difference was that the Revisionists were inclined to see far
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institution of slavery were substantial prior to the occurrence of four
events between 1829 and 1832. The 1829 Walker pamphlet urging slaves
to revolt, the first publication of William Lloyd Garrison's The Liberator
on January 1, 1831, and the Nat Turner rebellion of 1831 produced an
"agonizing reappraisal" in the form of the Virginia Slavery Debates of
1831-32. After the issue was narrowly resolved in favor of slavery,
Virginia and the rest of the South determined to resist emancipation
come what might, and Southern liberalism was dead. On that showing,
public attitudes should have dovetailed with economics and conspired
against the future of Taylor's theory of protection.
Yet, far from seeing a retreat after 1830, Taylor's common law doctrine gained increasing acceptance. Although South Carolina had rejected
it in 1831, 61 the Tennessee court was lending its weight to protection. In
1829, in Fields v. State,"' Judges Jacob Peck and Robert Whyte adopted
the Taylor position with much less ado than had been provoked on the
North Carolina bench. Whyte simply short-circuited the defendant's
elaborate argument that the common law had no application since "slavery
never existed in England"" by remarking that villeinage and slavery
showed a strong resemblance. Peck at least addressed himself to the main
point of the defendant-the master's right in Continental theory to his
slave's life. Arguing that the defendant was misconstruing Vattel,0 4 Peck
asserted that such was "a doctrine too monstrous for my mind.""
more Southern liberalism before 1830 and to blame Yankee abolitionists for
forcing the South into a "concert of defense" of slavery. See T. PRnssLy, AMERICANS INTERPRET THEIR CIVIL WAR passir; (1954). For a paradigmatic statement
of this view, see R. OSTERwEIs, ROMANTICISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE OLD

21-22 (1949).
"Helton v. Caston, 18 S.C.L. 45, 2 Bail. L. 95 (1831).
as 9 Tenn. 156 (1829), which held that a white acquitted of the statutory crime of
murdering a slave could still be convicted for common law manslaughter.
6
fId. at 157.
"The argument was seemingly correct. The citation given in the Reports is
VATTEL 421. I can find nothing in my edition of E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS (Dublin: Luke White, 1787) at that page, and there is no section with
so high a number. However Book III, Chapter 8, section 152, at 531, seems more
susceptible to Peck's view. True, Vattel says that if one takes a prisoner of war
and makes him a slave, "I still continue with him a state of war." In isolation this
implies the defendant's claim. But Vattel precedes his comment by stating, "The
ancients used to sell their prisoners of war for slaves. They indeed thought they
had a right of putting them to death. In every circumstance, when I cannot
innocently take away my prisoner's life, I have no right to make him a slave."
And he has just previously limited the right to kill to those "who have rendered
themselves guilty of some crime deserving death."
Or9 Tenn. at 163.
SOUTH
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I have been taught that christianity is part of the law of the land.
The four gospels upon the derk's table admonish me it is so every
time they are used in administering oaths .... Is it expected that we
must retire into the dark, and become in government partly christian
and partly pagan because we own pagans or savages for our property?
It is well said by one of the judges of North Carolina, that the master
has the right to exact the labor of the slave-that far, the rights of the
slave are suspended; but this gives the master no right over the life
of the slave. I add to the saying of the judge, that the law which says
thou shalt not kill, protects the slave; and he is within its very letter.
Law, reason, christianity and common humanity, all point one way 6°
Twenty-two years later the most brilliant antebellum Georgia judge,
Eugenius A. Nisbet, a moderate by that state's standards, would characterize Fields as resulting from a "fervid zeal in behalf of humanity to
the slave" and resting upon a wholly untenable legal ground."
Without passing on Nisbet's description of the Tennessee judges'
motives in Fields beyond noting that, of all the Southern courts, the
Tennessee bench seemed persistently the most inclined to find on behalf
of Negroes, 8 let me urge that the outcome in Fields was far more typical
of what happened in post-1830 Southern appellate courts than one would
expect. The reports of these courts clearly show that prosecutions of
whites did not end after 1830. They are replete with hundreds of civil
suits for abuse ranging from medical neglect and resultant ill-health to
maltreatment producing death. Of course, these suits, usually brought
by masters against hirers of their slaves, are by themselves hardly surprising. It would be difficult to disprove the contention that they were
motivated more by property interests than by humanitarianism. Thus,
with the exception of a very few opinions whose language constitutes
strong evidence for the presence of non-property motives,69 we need not
analyze them. Of far greater import are the criminal prosecutions of
whites initiated by the state. Fifty-five reached the appeals courts of seven
70
states between the rise of the abolitionist movement and the Civil War.
In thirty-eight, the white defendants failed to secure new trials-an mci00 Id. at 164-65.
"Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555 (1851).
" Negro Rights, supra note 53, at 203-67.
" See, e.g., Brock v. King, 48 N.C. 45 (1855). See also Polk, Wilson & Co. v.
Fancher, 38 Tenn. 336 (1858); Kirkwood v. Miller, 37 Tenn. 455 (1858).
" Thinly-populated Arkansas and Florida had no such prosecutions.
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TABLE I

APPEALS FROM CONVICTIONS BY WHITES AND' NEGROES IN NINE STATES

1830-1860
First column in each section indicates appeals made.
Second column indicates appeals granted.
All Injuries
to Negroes

State

Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas

12
0
0
4
7
9
16
3
4

7
0
0
1
4
3
2
0
0

TOTALS

55

17

All Trials
of Slaves

All Trials of
FreeNegroes

25
8
2
2
21
22
6
23
2

0
2
1
1
3
28
3
10
1

0
0
1
1
1
14
1
7
0

189 111

49

25

40
9
4
14
34
43
9
33
3

dence, as Table I shows, of "success" considerably lower than that of
convicted Negroes seeking reversals. To some extent, these convictions
of whites may well have stemmed from state motives similar to civil suits
brought by masters: valuable "goods" were worth protection. But to
what extent? Did, perhaps, some norms of justice and humanity, some
Enlightenment views of the slave as a human being, propel the state to
action ?
IV.

PROSECUTIONS FOR HOMICIDE OF SLAVES

There were thirty-seven prosecutions for homicide or attempted homicide of slaves between 1830 and 1 8 6 0 .71 Two points are suggested by the
bare figures. First, prosecutions did not taper off as the Civil War
approached; the majority of the cases appeared after 1850. Perhaps there
were simply more crimes; perhaps the per capita frequency of prosecutions did not increase. There is not a sufficient number of cases available
to make statistically reliable calculations. The important point that can
" A list of these cases and their outcome is included in Appendix I.

1970]

-A MORE EQUITABLE PAST?

be fairly deduced is that the Southern police system did not wholly cease
to protect slaves.
Second, the prosecutory system did not operate solely on whites who
had no "property-relationship" 72 with their victims. If such had been the
case, it would be easy to consider criminal suits as engendered by the
same property-motives as the civil damage cases. However, forty-one
per cent of the prosecutions were brought against masters and overseers
-thirteen against the former and two against the latter. Furthermore,
at least in terms of raw outcomes, the courts did not favor owners and
overseers as against "unconnected" whites. As Table II indicates, in
all three types of cases, the appeals refused outnumbered those granted
by at least two to one.
TABLE II
APPEALS FROM CONVICTIONS FOR HOMICIDE AND ATTEMPTED
IN SEVEN SOUTHERN STATES,

State
Appeals:
Alabama
Georgia
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
SUBTOTALS:
TOTAL:

HOMICIDE

1830-1860

Relation of Defendant to Slave
Overseer "Unconnected" White
Master
Heard/Granted Heard/Granted Heard/Granted
4
2
2
2
3

3
1
1
0
0

1
1

13

5

2

0
0

0

6
1
4

3
0
3

8
1
2

1
0
0

22

7

37 Heard; 12 Granted

Looking beyond the results to the judicial reasons, does the glow of
fairness persist? In my judgment the answer is clearly yes. Almost without exception the judges rendered decisions with exemplary fairness to
the Negro. To draw this conclusion, it is not necessary to explicate each
case in the exhaustive fashion by which we analyzed the decision-making
"Masters and life-tenants, members of their immediate families, overseers,
hirers.
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of the North Carolina court. Boon, Reed, and Hale not only set the
standards for later judges; they also serve as analytic paradigms of the
extent to which options lay open to the judicial mind. The thrust of
post-1830 decisions can be adequately illustrated by giving principal
attention to two sorts of cases: first, those ending in new trials and
second, those rejecting appeals that could plausibly have been granted.
None of the twelve reversals could have been fairly withheld. Thus,
in three Mississippi cases there had been a failure to prove that the cause
of the victim's death was the same as that charged in the indictment, no
proof that the defendant had murdered the slave except the testimony of
one witness that some hours before the homicide the defendant had been
pursuing the slave with a knife and that he had afterward made a threat
to kill him, and nothing in the official record to show that an indictment
had even been returned by a grand jury.7" The reasons for four of the
Alabama reversals granted during the last dozen years before the Civil
War, when Revisionist theory might expect the least degree of concern for
justice, adequately illustrate the neutrality that characterized the Alabama
court throughout the antebellum years: an unclear verdict, an indictment
erroneous as to ownership of the deceased slave, prosecution under the
wrong statute, and the admission of incompetent evidence.7 4 In the
South Carolina case the defendant had never been furnished with an
accurate copy of the indictment, which he had requested from the judge.7 5
The Georgia reversal came because one juror was obviously prejudiced
against the defendant. A day or two before the trial the juror had
observed that the defendant ought to be hanged. Afterwards he had said
"injustification of the verdict of guilty which he and his fellow jurors
had rendered, that the Martins were bad men anyhow, for he had heard
70
that they had beat a man pretty nigh to death the spring before."
What of the twenty-five appeals that were denied? Only one seems
to have been wrongly denied, but six others are also worth examining
71 Jenkins v. State, 30 Miss. 408 (1855) ; Bradley v. State, 18 Miss. (10 S. & M.)
618 (1848); Dowling v. State, 13 Miss. (5 S. & M.) 664 (1846). See also Oliver
v. State, 39 Miss. 526 (1860).
"' Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380 (1859) ; Ex parte Howard, 30 Ala. 43 (1857)
(the court required the defendant to post a 5000-dollar bond pending a second
trial under the correct statute) ; Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30 (1854) ; Cobia v.
State, 16 Ala. 781 (1849). See also State v. Slack, 6 Ala. 676 (1844); State v.
Marler, 2 Ala. 43 (1841).
" State v. Winningham, 44 S.C.L. 86, 10 Rich. 257 (1857).
" Martin v. State, 25 Ga. 494 (1858). Martin's son had also been indicted,
but he was not tried. Hence the plural reference in the juror's remarks.
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because under other circumstances-heard either by another antebellum
court or by a libertarian contemporary judiciary-they could have easily
been decided in favor of the white defendants.
The dubious one involved a jury shown to have been drinking while
discussing the defendant's fate.7 7 Yet since he could not prove that they
had "drunk excessively," he could not have a new trial. Perhaps the fact
that this was a Tennessee case makes it less surprising. It may be merely
an instance of that court's strong tendency to favor the Negro.
In addition to this case there were two others that a modern court
might have thought contained sufficient grounds for reversal. In 1854 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals refused to grant a new trial to a defendant
from whom a confession had been coerced. 78 The confession itself was not
used at trial, but it had led to the discovery of the corpus delicti. Three
years later, the Georgia court took the position that the defendant had
waived his right to challenge the trial by failing to make a timely objection to the fact that the panel of prospective jurors contained one less than
the number required by statute. 79 Let me emphasize that I am not
arguing that the courts should have accepted these motions for new
trials but merely that, had they done so, they could not fairly be accused
of straining to void just convictions.
The remaining four convictions found the courts of Texas, Alabama,
and Mississippi adopting common law liberalism; and, indeed, in one instance taking a more liberal position than that laid down by the preabolitionist North Carolina court. In 1847 the Texas Supreme Court could
see no merit in the absolutist theories of either Judge Hall or the South
Carolina Supreme Court that the common law did not of its own force
protect Negroes. Explicitly adopting the stance of the Tennessee Court
in Fields, Justice Royall T. Wheeler ruled that, despite the absence of a
specific statute about slaves, murder of a slave without malice constituted
common law manslaughter."0 He thought that the "learned court" of
Tennessee had reached a conclusion "so consonant to reason and principle
as scarcely to require the support of argument or authority.' ' sl Indeed, as
77Rowe v. State, 30 Tenn. 491 (1851). Cf. People v. Douglass, 4 Cow. 26
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825). "[T]he mere fact of drinking spirituous liquor is enough

to set aside the verdict." Id. at 36 (Southerland, J.).

State v. Motley, 41 S.C:L. 128, 7 Rich. 327 (1854).
" Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 545 (1857).
8 Chandler v. State, 2 Tex. 305 (1847).
78

811d.

at 309. Justice Wheeler's decision-making-and more generally that of

the Texas court-is illustrative of an intriguing minor theme of antebellum
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far as Wheeler was concerned, "the only matter of surprise is that it
should ever have been doubted." 8 Eight years later he was to express
himself with yet more vigor on the subject. Knifing a Negro in bondage
was "acrime against the law of nature and the laws of society, and equally
within the spirit and intention of the statute, as if... committed upon a
free person."8 3
In 1843 the Alabama Supreme Court sustained a conviction for manslaughter in which the indictment was "framed as at common law" but
concluded "against the form of the statute."84 To do so, the court had
to adopt the view that the statute in question merely raised the penalty for
a pre-existing common law offense.
Finally, in 1849 the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected an appeal
based on the lower court's refusal to let a defense witness testify that the
deceased slave "was generally insolent and impudent to white persons."8
Aware that allowing such an exclusion seemed to go against the North
Carolina precedent of State v. Tackett,s8 in which the court granted a new
trial because of exclusion of similar testimony, Chief Justice Sharkey distinguished Tackett on the grounds that there had been prior quarrels and
fights between the defendant and the victim, and that "the circumstances
attending the homicide were moreover unexplained. 8M The admission of
the evidence in Tackett could explain those circumstances; hence the
admission. Here, however, Sharkey said, the circumstances were already
explained and there was no evidence of prior fights. I find the distinction
not altogether convincing. In Tackett, Judge Taylor's opinion seemed to
assert the admissibility of general testimony regardless of special circumstances such as those to which Sharkey pointed. For Taylor, "the
temper and disposition of the deceased, and his usual deportment toward
white persons, might have an important bearing on .. . the degree of

provocation received by the prisoner."8 8 I find it hard to believe that
Southern justice. Wheeler, though born and raised in Vermont, was-like most
of his Texas colleagues-a believer in the right of secession. Yet when it came
to bequests of freedom, and criminal trials of or about Negroes, he and his
secessionist colleagues followed the Unionist minority's tendency to opt in favor
of the Negro's claims to justice and freedom.
8

Id.

Nix v. State, 13 Tex. 575, 579 (1855).
8,State v. Flanigin, 5 Ala. 477, 480 (1843).
"BJolly v. State, 21 Miss. (13 S.& M.) 223, 226 (1849).
8 N.C. 210 (1820).
8'21 Miss. (13 S.& M.) at 225.
88 N.C. at 216 (emphasis added).
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the North Carolina court of Taylor, Henderson, and Hall would have
refused Jolly a new trial.
In summary, the reasoning behind both the reversals and the denials
in which reversal would have been relatively easy strengthens the implication of the raw outcomes: the appellate judges do not seem to have been
straining to excuse white murderers of slaves.
V.

PROSECUTIONS FOR ATTACKS ON FREE NEGROES AND
LESSER INJURIES TO SLAVES

If only murder had caused the slave-states to bring prosecutions, it
would be feasible-though not necessarily compelling-to argue either that
the motivation behind the trials was solely the protection of property or
that if other motives entered in, at most they were barely vestigial and generally inactive remnants of Enlightenment humanitarianism. That is to
say, perhaps the white community punished even the slave's owner for
reasons of state policy: slaves cognizant of lack of protection even from
death might be more prone to insurrection. Alternatively, perhaps the
vestigial sense of guilt acted only in extremis.
However, two other types of prosecution brought between 1830 and
1860 thrust against the sufficiency of such interpretations-prosecutions
for less than homicidal attacks on slaves and prosecutions for injuries to
free Negroes. Four masters, one overseer, and five "unconnected" whites
appealed from sentences for abuse of slaves. Additionally, the courts
heard two appeals from convictions for murdering, and five appeals from
convictions for assaulting, free Negroes. As can be seen from Table
III, the appellants fared but slightly better than in the slave-murder
cases. In all, thirteen appellants were rebuffed, and less than half that
number received new trials.
Only the Alabama and North Carolina courts granted new trials,
and neither displayed undue anxiety to find a "way out" for the defendant. Turnipseed v. State9 genuinely required reversal. Turnipseed
had been convicted for cruel and unusual punishment of his own slave, but
his indictment had failed to specify what the instrument of punishment
was or exactly what he had done. It was, therefore, necessarily defective.
Chief Justice Henry W. Collier was seemingly not pleased to have to
reverse the judgment:
"6 Ala. 664 (1844).
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We regret the necessity imposed on us, of reversing the judgment in
this case, upon an objection taken after conviction, where the defect
complained of, could scarcely have operated prejudicially to the defendant. But we must hold these scales of justice in equipoise, and
however odious the offence, we must admeasure right to every one
according to law.90
The earliest of the four North Carolina reversals, State v. Mann,91
was a landmark decision in three respects. First, in setting aside the conviction of a master who had shot and wounded a Negress fleeing from
chastisement, it expounded a doctrine of absolute dominion that was to
become a reference point for conservative judges in other states. 2 The
lower court judge had instructed the jurors that Mann could be found
guilty of a cruel and unwarrantable punishment. Reversing the jury's
finding of guilt, Thomas Ruffin, 9 Taylor's successor on the bench, declared that as long as slavery existed "[w]e cannot allow the right of
the master to be brought into discussion in the Courts of Justice. The
slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is no appeal from
his master .

...

.""

It was the "duty of the Judges to recognize the full

dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the exercise of it
'
is forbidden by statute."95
Ruffin's words seemed to reject summarily
the whole tradition that John Louis Taylor and Leonard Henderson had
built up over thirty years. Additionally, they embraced more than was
needed to acquit defendant Mann.
0
0 Id. at 667. I am inclined to take his words at face-value. Collier was a strong
Unionist who successfully ran for re-election as governor in 1851 against a StatesRights candidate. He died in 1855. In suits for freedom he tended to follow legislative intent closely. See Negro Rights, supra note 53, at 3,57-59. In criminal trials
of Negros he demanded fair procedures. Id. 425, 457. See also Fair Trials for
Blacks, supra note 11.
13 N.C. 263 (1829). Because of the date, this first important slavery decision
of the post-Taylor court is not counted in Table III or in the generalizations about
frequency of prosecution.
03 E.g., George v. State, 37 Miss. 316 (1859), in which Taylor's jurisprudence
was objected to as "founded mainly upon.., the unmeaning tvaddle... of 'natural
law.'" Id. at 320.
" Judge, 1829-1833; Chief justice, 1833-1851; Ruffin was ranked by Roscoe
Pound in 1938 as one of the ten most important American judges of the nineteenth
century. R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 4 (1938). In respect to slavery jurisprudence, I am inclined to view him as less clear-headed, and
certainly less prone to favor the Negro, than his two successors, Frederick Nash
(Associate justice, 1844-1852; Chief Justice, 1852-1858) and Richmond Pearson
(Associate Justice, 1848-1858; Chief justice, 1858-1878). See Fair Trials for
Blacks, supra note 11, at - °113 N.C. at 267.
05 Id. at 268.
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Yet, they were not the product of a positive-good"' mentality. Ruffin
thought it "impossible" that the decision could be sympathized with outside of the South, and he confessed to a "struggle" in his "breast between
the feelings of the man and the duty of the magistrate." ' It is fair to say
that Ruffin's views at this time were in a kind of anomic stasis. On the
one hand, he disapproved of the "false and fanatical philanthropy" of
abolitionism, yet (and in the same sentence) he categorized slavery as "an
acknowledged evil." 9 9 He did not then, in 1829, even think a moral
argument on behalf of slavery possible:
What moral considerations shall be addressed to such a being to convince him what it is impossible but that the most stupid must feel
and know can never be true-that he is thus to labor upon a principle
of natural duty .... 100

The principle of domination of one man over another was "a principle
of moral right every person in his retirement must repudiate .

. .

. It

constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and free portion of our
population."'' There might be some barbarities that a court should stop,
10 2
but "the difficulty is to determine where a Court may properly begin."'
As Ruffin did not know what judicial action could be taken, the peculiar
institution of slavery itself required that Mann be acquitted.
The third point of importance was that Mann marked the deepest
impasse wrought by judicial self-restraint on the North Carolina Court.
The appointment of Joseph J. Daniel (1832-1848) and William Gaston
(1833-1844) brought two activists to the court who were prepared to
decide where the master's dominion ended. Five years after Mann, in a
decision equally important but as a future libertarian source of argument,
the court reversed the conviction of a slave who had murdered his master
while the master was endangering his life."0 ' This opposite result, a far
11 The "positive-good" theory embraced the view that slavery was a "positivegood" for both races. See generally W.
OLD SOUTH

JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE

(1935).

1'At least at the time. By 1855, Ruffin had changed his views. See his Address

Before the State Agriculture Society of North Carolina, 1 CAROLINA

CULTIVATOR

309, when he asserted that slavery had "a beneficial influence on [the] physical
and moral state of both races."
'8 13 N.C. at 264.
at 268.
00 Id.
100
Id. at 266.
181 I d.
1 02

Id. at 267.

...State v. Will, 18 N.C. 121 (1834).
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cry from Mann, was much more in tune with the path of the North
Carolina Supreme Court in adjudicating maltreatment cases during the
1840's and 1850's.
In at least two of the three later reversals fairness more clearly required
the North Carolina judges to grant new trials. All three involved injuries to free Negroes. In the first, State v. Hathcock,0 4 the indictment
charged Hathcock with disturbing the peace by standing outside the
house of some free Negroes, calling them names, and "offering them for
sale at auction." It was fatally defective because it failed to allege that
the Negroes were at home at the time.10 5
At the lower court trial of the second case, State v. Jowers,106 the
defendant had not been allowed to excuse his fighting with a free Negro
by pointing to the fact that the Negro had called him a liar. Judge Richmond Pearson, speaking for a majority of the court,'07 held that the
white had to be allowed an extra-judicial right to put a stop to "insolence,"'' 08 since insolence was not an indictable offense. 09 The absence
of a remedy would be "insufferable." Therefore the common law, whose
"principles" expanded "like the bark of a tree,

. .

.to accommodate ...

to any new exigence or condition of society,""' would excuse Jowers'
action.
If lowers' reversal were dubious, the third case,"' one of homicide,
clearly required a new trial. The lower court judge had charged the jury:
"If the deceased approached the prisoner in the manner stated by the
N.C. 52 (1846).
"or
Id. at 53-54.
10 33 N.C. 555 (1850).
107 One member dissented silently-almost certainly Frederick Nash rather than
Thomas Ruffin. See their differences of opinion in State v. George, 30 N.C. 324
(1848); State v. Henry, 31 N.C. 463 (1849); and particularly, State v. Caesar,
31 N.C. 391 (1849), reversing the homicide conviction of a slave for the murder
of a white who had been assaulting a Negro friend of the defendant. Ruffin thought
the reversal of the murder conviction boded future disaster: slaves, thus allowed
to resist, would denounce the injustices of slavery and "band together to throw
off their common bondage entirely." Id. at 428. Pearson, on the contrary, admired
the black's "valiant defense" of his comrade. Nash objected vehemently to Ruffin's
doctrine that slaves had to put up with abuse "that ...would rouse to phrensy a
white man .... I am told that policy and necessity require ... a different rule
...in the case of a slave. Necessity is the tyrant's plea, and policy never yet
stripped, successfully, the bandage from the eyes of justice." Id. at 409.
10 33 N.C. at 557.
10. But, in some other slave-states,
for instance South Carolina, it was a
punishable offense. See Ex parte Boylston, 33 S.C.L. 20, 2 Strob. 41 (1847).
10'29

'10

33 N.C. at 557.

...
State v. Floyd, 51 N.C. 392 (1859).
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witness and made no assault and the prisoner dismounted and slew him
with the bowie knife, it was murder." 2 As Judge Pearson observed,
the charge omitted an all-important aspect of the evidence, namely, that
"after the prisoner got off his horse, they engaged in a fight. This is
acting the play of Hamlet with the character of Hamlet omitted."118
Pearson's Shakespearian analogy may not have been too accurate, but
certainly he was right that "the gist and very essence of the matter was
that the parties had engaged in a fight .... So of course, it was error

to put any hypothesis to the jury omitting this fact.""' 4
If these were only the North Carolina cases, I might conclude that its
court of the 1840's and 1850's found good excuses for reversing convictions when it could and used poor ones-in Jowers, for example-when
it could not. However, three refusals to excuse white-imposed injuries
found the court turning down justifications considerably stronger than
the de minimis one rejected by the Arkansas court in a case where the
defendant tried to argue that his indictment was fatally defective for failing to state that a Wyandott Indian was a human being and thus a
possible object of murder" 5
In State v. Sewell,1 a white had killed a free Negress and, apparently,
raped her after she had died. These facts were too much for the supreme
court. It refused to allow proof that the defendant had had delirium
tremens a few days before the murder in order to sustain his plea of
insanity. In one of two battery cases, State v. Atkinsolt,l" 7 the defendants,
acting as "unofficial patrollers," had whipped some slaves found wandering away from their plantation. The court was "very far from thinking
that the authority which the law confers on patrols can sanction such outrageous conduct."1 8 In the other, State v. Norman,:"' the court seems
to have veered off "neutral" as in lowers. But this time they veered in
the other direction. The prisoner had whipped a free Negro, who was
serving a five-year term of slavery for larceny, with the permission of
his "master." The defendant's objective had been to force a confession
about the whereabouts of a gun thought to be the instrument of murder
by the Negro. Certainly, had the Negro made a confession, it would
" Id. at 397.
'11 s Id.
'Id.
'
Reed v. State, 16 Ark. 499 (1855).
12 48 N.C. 245 (1855).
1151 N.C. 65 (1858).
128 51 N.C. at 68.
11 53 N.C. 220 (1860).
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have been barred in any proceedings against him. Yet-and surprisingly
-in Norman the state was prosecuting the white for battery. In view of
the "master's" permission, the upholding of the conviction implied that the
Negro was not, for his five-year-term, as completely reduced to the status
of "slave" as one might have expected.
In general, I think it fairest to conclude that the North Carolina
judges-with the exception of Thomas Ruffin and one uninfluential
secessionist appointed just before the Civil War' 2 0 -never were able to
resolve the conflict between their perceptions of the Negro as property
and humanity. This inability was particularly evident in their wrestling
with the status of the free Negro in a slave society-a particularly grave
problem in a state that had many more such residents than her southerly
and westerly neighbors. 121 Three of the four influential North Carolina
judges of the 1850's-Ruffin, Pearson, and Battle-may well have concurred in the abstract with the observation in Jowers that in a slave state
the existence of such a "third class" was "unfortunate."'1 22 Yet their
immediate reflexes when confronted with the suit of an individual black
were to favor his cause. Pearson's and Battle's behavior indicated general agreement with the attitudes of their most libertarian brother, Frederick Nash, who was willing to presume almost anything in order to
free slaves claiming a right to liberty, who viewed whites attempting to
hinder liberty as vicious "birds of prey .

.

. upon the wing,"'

23

and who

considered attempts to frustrate anti-manumission laws as stemming from
a "pure and benevolent motive."' 12 Even Thomas Ruffin rejected out-ofhand the truly conservative doctrines of the pro-slavery courts in Georgia
and in Virginia after 1858125 that slaves were not rational beings who could
"'2 Matthias E. Manly (1859-1864).

I'l Nearly ten per cent of the Negro population in North Carolina was free.
This percentage was not as great as in Virginia, but was much greater than the
t:wo percent average prevalent in the Deep South-a fact that accounts, in combination with North Carolina's large number of slaves throughout the antebellum
period and with her early-developed appeals-process, for the comparative frequency
with which her judges rendered important decisions.
12" 33 N.C. at 556.
"' Mayo v. Whitson, 47 N.C. 231, 239 (1855).
""Grimes v. Hoyt, 55 N.C. 271, 274 (1855). For an argument that the North
Carolina Supreme Court became more liberal in regard to manumission during the
1852-58 Chief Justiceship of Frederick Nash, see Negro Rights, supra note 53,
at 323-30.
"'For an account of the sharp struggle on the Virginia bench in which profreedom judges-in the ascendancy from 1851 to 1858-found themselves outvoted
three-to-two in the latter years, see Negro Rights, supra note 53, at 258-66. Conpare Foster v. Foster, 51 Va. 636, 10 Gratt. 485 (1853) with Bailey v. Poindexter,

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

choose between freedom and slavery and opt where they wanted to go,
but rather-in the artificial eyes of the law-were "property" incapable
of choice.' 26 "Humanity"-or at least uncertainty about the Negro's condition when free-led them to refuse to change North Carolina presumptions on the basis of color. Only if the color be "black," rather than
"coffee," would the presumption be against freedom.'2 7
But perhaps the case most indicative of prevalent North Carolina
judicial sensibilities about the condition of antebellum free Negroes was
one heard less than a year before Abraham Lincoln's election. Though
a state action against a free Negro, it should be mentioned here because
it effectually inverted State v. Jowers.2 8 State v. Davis.. applied the
right of taking the law into one's own hands to a free Negro who was
resisting a white-a fact the more surprising since the white involved was
55 Va. 428, 14 Gratt. 132 (1858). From its creation in 1845, the Georgia court had
the solitary distinction of being the only Southern bench persistently opposed to
freedom-although occasionally it grudgingly upheld grants on the basis of pre1845 circuit-court precedents. For an analysis, see Negro Rights, supra note 53, at
188-202. For examples of such surrealism, see American Colonization Soc'y v.
Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448 (1857), in which the court refused to allow the Society to
"alleviate" the problem by taking bequeathed slaves to Africa and suggested that
it might be against state policy even to grant the Society standing to sue in
Georgia courts! Accord, Knight v. Hardeman, 17 Ga. 253 (1855), in which freedom was refused to a Maryland Negress transported to Georgia before her liberty
fell due under a Maryland will at the age of thirty. For more sensible holdings,
see Hogg v. Capehart, 58 N.C. 72 (1857); Guillemette v. Harper, 38 S.C.L. 75,
4 Rich. 186-(1850).
...
See Reeves v. Long, 58 N.C. 355 (1860) (Manly, J., the lone North Carolina secessionist wrote the opinion); Harrison v. Everett, 58 N.C. 163 (1859);
Redding v. Findley, 57 N. C. 215 (1858) (Ruffin, J., explicitly repudiated the
majority in Bailey v. Poindexter, 55 Va. 428, 14 Gratt. 132 (1858). For similar
"humanity" holdings, see Stephenson v. Harrison, 40 Tenn. 728 (1859); Purvis
v. Sherrod, 12 Tex. 140 (1854); Elder v. Elder, 31 Va. 930, 4 Leigh 252 (1836).
17
See Nichols v. Bell, 46 N.C. 32 (1853). In this area their holdings effected
the desires of the most influential post-1830 South Carolina judge-Chief Justice
John Belton O'Neall-to change his state's laws in a direction more favorable to
the Negro. In 1848 that extraordinary judge drew the wrath of the state Senate's
Judiciary Committee for recommending, inter alia: placing the burden of proof of
color not on the Negro but on the State; giving all Indians the vote and allowing
them to hold office; repealing laws restricting the right to free and educate Negroes;
granting the right of habeas corpus to free Negroes; extending to both bond
and free the right to testify under oath; reducing enticement of slaves to escape
to a non-capital offense; re-opening South Carolina to free Negro travel and settlement (a position more liberal than that of Illinois or Indiana); and, finally, recognizing the legality of interracial marriage. For a discussion see Nash, Negro
Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The
Extraordinary Chief JAstice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C.L. Rxv. 141 (1969).
...See p. 223 supra.
12952 N.C. 52 (1859).
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the local constable. Lawrence Davis, the Negro, had neither paid his
city taxes nor turned out to work on the streets, which was the alternative
to payment. The constable had been detailed to serve notice on him to
appear in court for default of payment, but instead of so doing, he tried
to arrest him and to tie his hands. Thereupon Davis struck the constable
and continued to do so until he fled. The state then proceeded against Davis
for assault and battery. It is not hard to imagine what would probably
have happened to a free Negro who tried this sort of self-help tactic fifty
years later. Yet in December 1859, the court-notwithstanding the decline
in liberal perspectives with Nash's death-acquitted Davis. Conviction,
Judge Pearson stated, would require the extreme "proposition that a free
Negro is not justified under any circumstances in striking a white man."' 3 0
To this he could not assent.
An officer of the town having a notice to serve on the defendant,
without any authority whatever, arrests him and attempts to tie him!

Is not this gross oppression? .... What degree of cruelty might not
the defendant reasonably apprehend after he should be entirely in the
power of one who had set upon him in so high-handed and lawless a
manner? Was he to submit tamely? Or was he not excusable in
resorting to the natural right of self-defense ?131
Self-defense was "a natural right." Proper subordination of the free
Negro might require "that the right should be restricted, yet nothing
short of manifest public necessity can furnish a ground for taking it away
absolutely.' 3 2 In the instant situation, Pearson and his colleagues saw
no manifest public necessity, and Davis went free.
"o Id. at 53.

33

132 Id.

54-55.
Id. at
at 53.

...
Not only the North Carolina court objected to "police brutality" in the
antebellum era. See State v. Greenwood, 8 S.C.L. 111, 1 Mill 420 (1817), upholding the conviction of a constable for assault and false imprisonment of a
free Negro. For further indications of North Carolina views, see Brock v.
King, 48 N.C. 45 (1855), holding that a jailor was not liable because he had
failed to place in chains a captured runaway slave who ,had escaped a second
time. In the light of post-Civil War chain-gangs, Judge Battle's reason was
extraordinary; chaining the slave would have been "cruel." Id. at 49. See also
State v. Jacobs, 50 N.C. 259 (1858), a free Negro case in which the court was
more libertarian than the United States Supreme Court has ever been. The
Negro-on trial for infringing a gun-control law that applied only to Negroesargued that his being forced to present himself before the jurors so that they
could tell his color amounted to self-incrimination. Battle agreed! Contra, Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910). Battle's argument that though the defendant
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Four other state supreme courts besides Alabama's and North Carolina's heard appeals from maltreatment-of-Negro-convictions-those of
Texas, Mississipi, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The Texas and Mississippi Courts each heard but one suit. As the Texas appellant's claim
was as flimsy as that in the Arkansas Wyandott Indian case,18 4 I have to
rely on the expressions of attitudes in the Texas murder cases already discussed. 8 5
The single Mississippi case, however, is more significant. Scott v.
State'30 was an appeal by an overseer from a conviction for cruel and
unusual punishment of a slave. Scott suggested to the court an ingenious "out." His indictment named him only as the "overseer." The
1822 statute on which it was based spoke of the "master or other person
entitled to the service of any slaves."' 8 7 Overseers are "not beneficially
interested in" and do "not own the labor of slaves committed to their
charge." Therefore the indictment's description did not bring him under
the statute with sufficient clarity to convict. 8 Further, the only alternative
mode of sustaining the conviction was to hold him indictable under the
common law; but that solution was barred by the line of logic laid down
in Ruffin's State v. Mann opinion.'8 9 Surely the court could have accepted
Scott's argument; however, Chief Justice Smith, remarking that its
acceptance "would, to a great extent, defeat the benign and salutary purposes of the law,"' 4 would have none of it and the conviction was upheld.
Scott does not, of course, prove that the Mississippi court's motives were
primarily humanitarian protection of slaves. It could still be argued that

they were concerned only with protecting property interests-with guarding the master's property against the overseer's conduct. But this argument strikes me as far-fetched for reasons quite apart from the language
of Smith's opinion. It was not shown that Scott had permanently damaged the slave, and, even if he had, the master's interest would have been
adequately protected by a civil suit asking monetary damages from the
had to be in court, he was not "bound to stand or sit within view of the jury,"
50 N.C. at 260, strikes me as a greater extension of the "self-incrimination" privilege than one could expect even from the United States Supreme Court today.
18, See p. 224 supra.
1 See pp. 217-18 supra.
1"831 Miss. 473 (1856).
1
""Act of June 18, 1822, ch. 73, § 44, [1823] Revised Miss. Laws 369, quoted in
Miss. 473, 475 (1856).
Scott v. State, 31
...
31 Miss. at 473-74.
See pp. 221-23 supra.
14031 Miss. at 479.
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overseer. Thus, Scott v. State at least creates the presumption that
"humanitarianism" was a factor in the court's motivation.
The South Carolina and Tennessee cases did not offer such plausible
grounds for reversal; neutrality required affirming the convictions. In
consequence, my concern is restricted to the nature of the offenses against
which the states acted and to judicial expressions of opinion.
The South Carolina court said: first, and in opposition to their rejection of common law criminal prosecutions for assaults on slaves, that a
white could be punished under the common law for assaulf and battery
on a free Negro; second, that pistol-whipping a slave constituted cruel
and unusual punishment-as did, third, two hundred strokes with an
India rubber whip; and fourth, that keeping slaves on a vegetarian diet
and not renewing their shoes or clothing for seventeen months constituted punishable maltreatment.141 Only the last charge was brought
against a master, but here a court strongly disposed to indulgence could
have released him, for, in sustaining the conviction, the South Carolina
court disregarded all the defense witnesses' testimony. These witnesses
were, besides the master himself, his two daughters and several neighbors.
The neighbors were, the court decided, not in a position to know, while the
defendant's testimony was "vague and evasive; and that of his young
girls, incredible."' 4 2 On the other side of the scales was only the overseer's word, but this, they thought, "should outweigh that of all the
other witnesses."' 14 3 The court was solidly in favor of the statute:""'
The law is salutary, even more by the opprobrium which follows a
a conviction, than by the penalties for its violation. Public opinion
derives force from its sanction; and the rapaciousness of the owner is
checked by fear of its active interference. 45
The Tennessee court heard a nearly similar case, one of providing
inadequate clothing, and were disgusted. 4 They were more than disgusted by the case of Worley v. State,4 7 in which the master had castrated
""State v. Harden, 29 S.C.L. 63, 2 Speers 152 (1832); State v. Wilson, 25
S.C.L. 66, 1 Cheves 163 (1840) ; State v. Harlan, 39 S.C.L. 189, 5 Rich. 470 (1852) ;
State v. Bowen, 34 S.C.L. 299, 3 Strob. 573 (1849). See also State v. Boozer, 36
S.C.L. 11, 5 Strob. 21 (1850).
34 S.C.L. at 300, 3 Strob. at 575.
"I81d.
""Act of 1740 for the Better Government of Slaves, § 38, 7 S.C. Stat. 397
(1840). In pertinent part, this act required a master to provide adequate food,
clothing and shelter for his slaves.
140

34 S.C.L. at 300, 3 Strob. at 575.
Britain v. State, 22 Tenn. 203 (1842).
30 Tenn. 171 (1850).
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a slave "of a most wicked and turbulent disposition, ... in the constant
habit of running away, . . . lewd and incontinent, and in other respects
of very bad morals and character.' 1 48 The master's action could not be
extenuated by ample proof that he was generally "remarkable for his
kindness and humanity towards his slaves," and that for a long time up
to the moment of his crime he had tried "mild and reasonable means to
reform" the slave. 49 Said Judge Nathan Green:
We utterly repudiate the idea of any such power and dominion of the
master over the slave, as would authorize him thus to maim his slave
for the purpose of his moral reform. Such doctrine would violate the
moral sense and humanity of the present age.150
It is possible of course that Nathan Green's humanitarian statements
were no more genuinely motivated by sympathy for the Negro than may
have been his pronouncements about the natural equality of slaves when
he allowed them to probate their master's will in Ford v. Ford.'51 Posssibly the Tennessee judges were motivated only by a desire to counter
abolitionist propaganda. If so, they camouflaged their motives oddly in
three other cases-two civil suits between whites and one criminal
prosecution of a free Negro-for the result of their behavior was to
highlight rather than to tone down instances of cruelty. In setting wrongs
aright, the primary effect was to publicize relatively obscure injustices,
particularly in the free Negro case.
The two civil suits were both to recover the value of slaves murdered
by whites: the first shot for supposedly taking part in an insurrection"5 2
and the second lynched while in jail awaiting trial on charges of raping
and murdering a white female. 53 The judges had little patience with the
defendants. They seemed anxious to make sure that the masters got at
least their money's worth, but their language suggests two other motives
-anxiety for the security of society and ire over the illegal taking of
Negroes' lives.
In Kirkwood v. Miller the defendants won their first trial. On appeal
the supreme court reversed for two reasons: the introduction of newspaper accounts "on the subject of the apprehended insurrection"' 4 and
18

Id. at 175.

149

Id.

I° Id.
5 See p. 203 supra.
.
"2Kirkwood v. Miller, 37 Tenn. 455, 458 (1858).
...
Polk, Wilson & Co. v. Fancher, 38 Tenn. 336 (1858).
1 37 Tenn. at 458.
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the absence of proof connecting the murdered slave with an insurrectionary
scheme, which the judges doubted "existed outside of the distempered
imagination of the people."' 155 At the second lower court trial, all the
defendants were held liable. Two of them then appealed on the grounds
that they had not struck the death blow. The court thought their argument "very ingenious and labored," but rejected it strongly.
We find no justifiable cause .. .for the capture . . . of the slave,
in the first instance . . . He had not misbehaved himself in any
way ....
After being . . .unlawfully tied with a rope, he became

alarmed at what he saw and heard around him, and in endeavouring
to make his escape from this unlawful confinement, was slain by one
156
of his pursuers, in the joint purpose to recapture him ....
The court held that the "wild panic, and vague, undefined apprehensions
about a 'rising . . .of the slaves,' " could not save the defendants from

liability. Both the "general interest of slave-holders" and "all proper
principle" establish "the necessity of the most stringent laws on this
subject. Humanity, as well as the general interest, demand the enforcement of these laws."' 57 Slaves "are property-but have souls and feelings, and claims upon humanity. Those who take it upon themselves, in
these periods of groundless panic, to slay and destroy, without sanction
of law, must do so at their peril."' 58 A lawless spirit could not be
tolerated. Even if the proper course of the law "should fall short" of
preventing all evil, "the evil had far better be endured than to throw off
its restraints, and permit men to take vengeance into their own hands."' 5 9
In Polk, Wilson & Co. v. Fancher the lower court had permitted the
defendants to adduce testimony that the slave's character was bad and
that he was thus a valueless "article." On appeal, the supreme court
said that the verdict in favor of the defendants was "a mockery of
The judges insisted that the owners should get a fair value,
justice."'
but their expressions of opinion went further. If the slave had been
guilty of the crimes charged,
no punishment would have been too severe for him....

But no man,

whether bond or free, is to be condemned or punished without a hear457-58.
11
Id. at
at 459.
,go Id.
157 Id.
1
Id. at 460.

.00
38 Tenn. at 341.
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ing-a fair and impartial trial. There is neither valor nor patriotism
in deeds like these. Not valor, because there is no contest-the victim
is already in bonds and harmless; nor patriotism, because the country
has provided for the proper and legal punishment of offenders, and
needs not the aid of mobs and lawless combinations to wield the sword
161
of justice or quicken its stroke.
The slave's "guilt had not been established. The presumption of in0 2
nocence can only be removed by proof upon a legal trial."'
In Mayor v. Winfield,"0 8 the free Negro case, the Tennessee court
went beyond mixed indignation about property rights, public security,
and claims upon humanity. The judges insisted upon the positive extension of certain rights to "free persons of color." In March 1839, the
city of Memphis had established a curfew for slaves and free Negroes
that forbade them to be on the city streets after 10 p.m. Winfield was
arrested for violating the curfew, jailed for the night, and fined ten
dollars without being given a trial. The local justice of the peace voided
the ordinance and released the defendant, and the city appealed unsuccessfully both to an intermediate and to the supreme court. Judge Green
and his brethren took a dim view of the ordinance. "This new curfew
law . . . cannot . . . be enforced against free persons of color, for we
think it is high-handed and oppressive, and enacted by the corporation
Not only was the conviction void for
without any authority ..
lack of a jury trial; "it is an attempt to impair the liberty of a free
person unnecessarily."' 65 After all, the free Negro must live. "Every one
knows that in cities, very often, the most profitable employment is to be
found in the night, loading and unloading steamboats and other craft,
waiting about hotels, theatres, places of amusement both public and
private, wood-cutting, fire-making, shoe- and boot-cleaning . . . . "I To
deprive the free person of color of these "sources, in large cities, of much
profit" would be virtually compelling him to act as a "wild beast, to hide
,167
his head in his den from ten o'clock until daylight ....
The court pointed out that had there been any attempt to "enforce
such an ordinance against a free white person, public indignation would
201 Id. at 338.
162 Id. at 339.
1.27 Tenn. 707 (1848).
16, Id. at 709.
'or Id.
166
167 Id.
Id. at 710.
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have been aroused, and the corporation would not only have been sued to
recover back the fine, but also for false imprisonment.'

168

The free Negro could not be denied all rights. He
is not, it is true, a citizen of full privileges in our own state, but still
he is a free person, and cannot be punished in this summary mode ....
The lot of the free negro is hard enough at best, resulting from necessity... out of the relation in which he stands to his brethren who are
in servitude, and it is both cruel and useless to add to his trouble by
unnecessary and painful restraints in the use of such liberty. 6 9
VI. TH

MEDIATIVE JUDICIAL ROLE AND THE RULE OF

LAW

Such was appellate judicial treatment of the white who injured the
antebellum Negro. Even after imposing the qualifiers that caution and
balance behoove-that many crimes by whites must have never reached
the supreme courts, that the statutes barring Negro testimony immodestly disadvantaged the black grievant, that the actions of Southern
courts may have lessened but did not eliminate the terrors of the peculiar
institution, etc.-three specific propositions about the workings of antebellum Southern justice appear warranted.
First, the police systems of the slave states did act against whites, at
least to the extent of trying fifty-five criminal cases. Probably other cases
never reached the appellate courts. A South Carolina judge, writing in
1832, justified a common law conviction for battery of a free Negro on
the grounds that "[t] he practice to indict a white man for an assault and
battery on a free negro, seems to be well settled, by a variety of circuit
decisions, for upwards of thirty years."' 70 I cannot determine whether
there were unappealed convictions or whether all of the circuit indictments
prior to this one resulted in acquittals. Nor can I know how large was
the "variety of circuit decisions." It is, however, likely that, after 1832
as before, the state prosecutors brought more successful indictments than
reached the high courts.
Second, juries were sufficiently bestirred to find some defendants
guilty. Several hundred white Southerners-more if there were unappealed convictions-acted against fellow whites.
Third-and the prime consideration here-in almost all the cases that
were reviewed on appeal, appellate judges acted with considerable fair"' Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
109

,0Id.
State v. Harden, 29 S.C.L. 63, 63-64, 2 Speers 152, 153 (1832).
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ness. Only one of the twenty-four trials for homicide and attempted homicide of slaves reached a non-neutral result. In Rowe v. State, where the
jurors had been drinking, the white defendant ought to have received a
new trial."
There was no significant difference in the courts' dispositions of cases involving masters or overseers as opposed to "unconnected"
whites. The cases of non-fatal abuse of slaves seem to have reached
similarly neutral conclusions with the possible exception of Scott v.
State. 7 2 I have no doubt that the legislature intended to embrace overseers in its prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. However, it
does strike me that the Mississippi court followed the spirit rather than
the letter of the law to find against the overseer and thereby ignored the
general precept that penal laws be construed narrowly.
Trials for murder and assault to free Negroes also reached clearly
neutral ends with the exception of State v. lowers, in which insolence
was held to justify the battery. 7 3 Looked at from the perspectives of the
mid-twentieth century, the fact that the North Carolina court thought that
self-help, in the absence of an alternative mode of prosecution, was
excusable may strike one as "illiberal." Certainly the North Carolina
judges did not believe in the complete equality of races. Indeed, I doubt
that even Justice William Gaston, whose conviction that slavery should
be abolished was deep-dyed, would have taken that position. But judgments of "liberalism" and "conservatism," of "fairness" and "unfairness,"
should be formed in relation to the social context of nineteenth-century
America, not in relation to an "a-racial Utopia," not even in relation
to blissful estimates of contemporary Northern treatment of the Negro.
Secondly, this case should be compared with State v. Davis,174 which
demonstrates that it would be clearly incorrect to conclude that the
North Carolina judges thought that the free Negro had no rights whatsoever. In that instance he had the "natural right" of self-defense against
"police brutality." Likewise, the Tennessee judges in the Memphis curfew
case seemed to think that the free Negro had some rights. 17 r
These specific propositions lead to a general judgment. Whatever else
may be said about the antebellum South's treatment of the Negro, the
goals toward which the appellate courts were working appear manifestly
more consonant with decency than could be anticipated by extrapolating
" See p. 217 supra.

...
See p. 228-29 supra.
...
See p. 223 supra.
""See pp. 226-27 supra.
..See pp: 232-33 supra.
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backward from twentieth-century Southern jurisprudence. In this sense,
the decisions studied here parallel in thrust the markedly libertarian insistence on reasonably fair trial standards when antebellum Negroes themselves stood accused of crime. So too, they are largely consonant with
pervading libertarian tendencies to find in favor of Negroes bringing suit
17
for freedom during the antebellum era. 1
Why should this be? Some sort of explanation is urgently called for.
I do not think that the cases can be explained away by arguing that
the courts were merely purveying deathless words of humanitarianism for
purposes of counter-propaganda against Northern abolitionism. Of course,
it is unlikely that property motives did not enter measurably into judicial
calculations. But there are at least three reasons to deem it equally unlikely that their motives were always either so cunning or so impure.
First, judges whom we know to have been exponents of the positive
goodness of slavery, such as Justice Harris of Mississippi or Chief Justice
Lumpkin of Georgia, did not hesitate both to expatiate upon the peculiar
institution's virtues and its attackers' moral baseness. Nor did they hesitate to upbraid fellow judges whose opinions they believed thrust in too
liberal a direction. A would-be "cunning" propagandist had his work too
often undone by the bold dicta of pro-slavery exponents to anticipate
success. Second, the effect of decisions was not infrequently to punish
precisely those who had no property-interests in punishment-malevolent
masters. Third, unless I misread utterly the tone of the opinions convicting whites, genuine feeling is there. The opinions of liberal judges
whose views of the peculiar institution are not known are too similar in
tone to those (for instance, William Gaston of North Carolina) whose
statements and actions off the bench leave no room for doubt about their
personal hostility toward slavery. In brief, both the wording and the
practical punitive effect of these decisions inclines me strongly to the view
that they tapped a genuine demand that the right of Negroes to consideration as humans be enforced by the governmental structure. That conclusion leads us back once again to the problem of explanation.
Unfortunately, the most obvious explanatory possibility will not bear
scrutiny. I am thinking of the notion that the occupants of these benches
were statistically a very peculiar lot. Either, and rather doubtfully, they
happened to belong to anti-slavery sects such as the Quakers or, and
more plausibly, they were liberal, aristocratic holdovers from a Jeffer"' The first of these two areas is explored in Fair Trials for Blacks, supra
note 11. For a full treatment of suits for freedom, see Negro Rights, supra note 53.
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sonian day cut short in other governmental branches by the rise of racist
"Jacksonian rednecks." The fact is that analysis of the judges' socioeconomic characteristics simply does not help much. Many liberal judges
were appointed after the the rise of Yankee abolition. There is no "helpful"
skewing of the judiciary in terms of religion, class-background, or education that would clarify the apparent persistence of tolerance for the black.
Indeed, most of the statistically-derived suggestions push in the opposite
direction or in none at all. To give two examples: the religions most
strongly represented among the more libertarian judges were Fundamentalism and Episcopalianism, and the lower the judge's socio-economic
origins the more inclined he seemed to be to apply the law in favor of
1 77

the Negro.

One has, in short, to look elsewhere. Two possibilities present themselves. The first interpretation would suggest that characterizations of the
post-1830 South as reacting in a blind, monolithic defense of slavery
against its Northern opponents are vastly overdrawn, that, really, the
antebellum South was quite different, was far more "liberal," than accepted
historical interpretations would have it. On this showing, the courts'
behavior was representative of general public opinion rather than a
curious sport.
But this possibility strikes me as attempting to seize too much ground.
A second interpretation seems more tenable. Such an interpretation would
seek its analytic ground in role theory and begin by suggesting that the
major sources upon which historians have drawn to characterize antebellum Southern views have been skewed in favor of a picture of ardent
support for slavery. I am thinking, of course, of the writings of Southern
editors, senators, congressmen and "sociological" apologists for slavery.
The word "apologist" suggests the crux of the matter. That sociological writers on behalf of the peculiar institution were engaged in a "peculiarly" apologetic role requires no demonstration. What of editors, elected
representatives, and judges? Many editors, interested in circulation, might
well have reflected in their papers and journals a majority viewpoint.
More important, reporting and thus reading national news, they would
have come across, in their daily work, a substantial quota of "foreign"
attacks upon the structure of Southern society. The same is true in
greater measure of Southern congressmen and senators in Washington.
If there was any locus in the United States-short of excursions to
1,7 For discussions of the analytic results recapitulated here, see FairTrials for
Blacks, supra note 11 ; Negro Rights, supra note 53.
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abolitionist Boston-where they would hear plenteous vituperation about
the mores of their native region, it would surely have been in the halls of
Congress. If the onslaughts of John Quincy Adams and Charles Sumner
were to provoke a "concert of defence," surely the first instruments to
respond in unsympathetic vibration would be the voices of elected
Southerners.
By contrast, a member of a slave state's highest court remained relatively insulated from frontal attacks. To be sure, as a member of fle
Southern intelligentsia, the judge would read of them, and, on summer
trips to Northern "watering-places," perhaps encounter them directly.
Nevertheless, the average quotidian force of these attacks must have been
considerably less. If the concert of defense was indeed in any great
measure the consequence of abolitionist attacks, it is reasonable to expect
a correspondingly lesser reaction from the members of the bench.
This suggested interpretation is by no means an attempt to resurrect
a nineteenth-century view of the judge as different in kind from other
political actors. It is offered merely to note a difference in degree of
engagement in what Lester Milbrath has aptly called the politician's
"gladiatorial" role.y78 There are, certainly, ample reasons for expecting
attitudinal differences to spring from variances in roles.
First of all, incursions of Jacksonian democratic ideology upon the
methods of selection of Southern judges were fairly limited. It is true
that under the Virginia Constitution of 1851 judges were required to
undergo the periodic reckoning of running for popular re-election. However, terms lasted for a rather lengthy twelve years. Similarly in Tennessee, Jacksonian egalitarianism simply reduced the length of the
legislatively-selected term from twelve to eight years. The term's span
afforded substantially greater leeway for making "unpopular decisions"
than was granted to legislators and governors elected every two, four, or
six years.
Additionally, "populist" attitudes toward judges-as distinct from
their structural reflection in limited terms and popular elections-appear
to have fallen well short of equating judicial and legislative accountability
to the people's will. I believe that there is substantial applicability throughout the South of Henry S. Foote's explanation of the extraordinary
number of Whigs-in view of their statewide minority status-elected
to the Mississippi bench during the antebellum period. Foote argued

178 See L. MiLBRATH,

POLiTICAL PARTICIPATION 8-25

(1965).
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that Mississippi attitudes entailed popular selection of judges with regard
to their personal and legal capacities rather than to their party affiliations.1' A supporting illustration is provided by the career of Chief Justice
William Sharkey. His Whiggery should have been one strike against
him. The fact that he took up the minority position on an issue about
which Mississippi tempers ran high during the late 1840's-by refusing
to hold that Mississippi could repudiate her state bonds-should have
constituted at least one, if not two, more. Yet he had no difficulty
returning to the court when he ran for re-election. The voting public
seemed to feel that the judge was, at any rate, a special species of
politician.
Certainly, in that heyday-before the fourteenth amendment so greatly restricted their power as final arbiters-state supreme court judges
enjoyed positions of both influence and prestige easily underestimated
in retrospect. Roscoe Pound's list of the "ten judges who must be ranked
first in American judicial history," s0 bears witness to their influence: six
of the ten made their national reputations entirely from state benches.
The preference of judges who later became senators for retaining their
judicial titles suggests their prestige. So too does the difficulty encountered by presidents seeking to convince state judges that a federal
cabinet post constituted an advancement. Thus, the Court President of
Virginia, Henry St. George Tucker, rejected Jackson's offer of the
Attorney-Generalcy, while Millard Fillmore was no more successful in
persuading William Sharkey to take on the Secretaryship of War.
In sum, while Jacksonian democratic theory prescribed to the legislator the role of delegate of the people's will on specific issues, its rejection of the older view of the representative as a wise and superior man
elected for his capacity to debate rationally "far from the madding
crowd" was much less thorough-going in respect to the judicial branch. 8"
To a measurable extent, the Southern judge continued to be ascribed the
role of mediating between the "right" of the constitutional legacy of the
past, the statutory expressions of public "will," and the "interests" of
suitors.
The plausibility of these role differences in accounting for the fair'"H. FOOTE, THE BENCH AND BAR OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST 59
(1876).
8' R. PouND, supra note 93, at 4.
.8For a brilliant exposition of theories of representation and their political consequences, see S. BEER, BiTISH POLITICS IN

THE COLLECTVIST

AGE

(1966).
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ness of judicial behavior toward the Negro depends, of course, upon the
real existence of what several historians have recently argued was a persistent feature of the antebellum Southern psyche: moral doubts--despite
brave political and sociological rhetoric-about the South's treatment of
the black against the developing liberal ideology of the nineteenth-century
"North Atlantic community," doubts that may have been driven underground by abolitionism but that dwelt on at a subconscious level. As
Charles Sellers has put it, no historian who describes the Old South
as "confident and united in its dedication to a neo-feudal order" and
who misses "the inner turmoil of the antebellum Southerner can do
justice to the ...

southern experience.

'

Ifany such doubts persisted

up to the Civil War, it seems plausible to expect that their likely form
of continuing articulation in the political arena would be in the appellate
judges' decision-making. Besides the role distinctions already suggested,
at least two further aspects of the judicial vocation strengthen the likelihood of such articulation.
The first bears specifically on the judicial role in adjudicating suits
concerning Negroes. The senator or congressmen perceived slavery primarily in general terms. So too, did the state legislator enacting the laws
of slavery. Obviously, this was not their only type of perception. If
nothing else, Southern senators had Negro valets who took their coats
when they returned to their Washington lodgings. But, and importantly,
the judicial vocation entailed a different weighting of perceptions. To
be sure, the judge would have been aware that the individual suit-the
particular claim of a Negro to a fair trial, or freedom, or the specific
horrors of a particular slave's murder by a white-contained, depending
upon the way he decided the case, alternative general implications for the
societal process. Nonetheless, the specific perception was eminently
present in the form of the individual Negro, or his counsel, standing
before him seeking justice. It is a commonplace of social psychology
that an individual's prejudices are frequently stronger when he expresses an ethnic generalization than when he is engaged in specific
personal dealings with individuals of the "despised" group. May there
not be a psychological analogy here? The legislator, acting in general,
might by the nature of his job, be far more inclined to rule that the
"' TiaESOUTHEPNER AS AmznicAx 40 (C. Sellers, Jr. ed. 1960). For a brilliant
exigesis of the philosophic tortures imposed upon the Southern mind by the attempt
to square Enlightenment ideals and chattel slavery, see L. HARTZ, THE LmEAL
TRADITION IN AmERiCA 145-200 (1955).
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Negro be treated as an ordinary article of commerce. For the judge,
such a ruling may well have been more difficult. If there was any tension
induced by dual perceptions of the Negro as property and humanity,
surely the judicial forum was the most likely place for its resolution in
favor of humanity.
A final difference consists in the peculiar vocational interest of the
judge in the rule of law. The antebellum vitality of this interest seems
to have been considerable at the appellate level-thus its prevalence over
other political objectives in the mind of a secessionist such as Alex
Handy when dissenting from the "ourang-outang jurisprudence" of his
8 3

Brother Harris.1

In sum, it seems fair to conclude that the characteristic most distinguishing antebellum from post-Reconstruction Southern appellate
justice was the former's ideological irresoluteness. In the judicial arena
four ideological components of the Southern value-system fought an
unfinished battle: the supremacy of whites versus the supremacy of law,
and the Negro as property versus the Negro as human. For the Negro,
the irony of the Civil War and Reconstruction lay in the gap emergent
between the general legal form of rules and their specific application.
Despite the formal advantages that accrued with the Civil War Amendments, the two concepts that had assisted his condition in antebellum days
-the rule of law and the black as human-weakened measurably by 1900.
Such was the perversity of history: the "unfree" economic marketplace
seemed to allow in the judicial marketplace a freer competition of these
four ideological components. Of course, that competition did not abolish
the shackles or terrors of slavery. Nor did it establish equality. What
the Southern jurists sought was not so much to promote "due process"
and "equal protection of the laws" in their most latitudinarian contemporary meanings, but rather to strengthen an ordered justice that
might be best termed "due protection under the laws." For that age
and culture such an enterprise was remarkable. Perhaps, in light of the
cultural stresses imposed upon Southern mores by post-Brown v. Board
of Education federal statutes and decisions, it may be too much to
expect Southern supreme courts to exhibit today the legal creativity of
a century ago-although, surely, the pressures from without are hardly
greater than they were just before the Civil War. Be that as it may, I
find it difficult to doubt that the Negro's present condition would be notably
...
See p. 202 supra.
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improved had twentieth-century Southern judges displayed their forbears' zeal for closing the gap between the formal structure of law and
its application.
APPENDIX
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